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Introduction
I had the honor of being invited by the Fundação
Oswaldo Cruz to comment on an article by my
friend Nilson do Rosário Costa. It is a timely paper
which stimulates a quality debate on the path
followed by the Brazilian social policy from the
late 1980s until today.
While examining this path, the author defends
two central arguments:
1. The social policy implemented from 1990
presented a “notable continuity” with the social
protection project which emerged from the
redemocratization agenda and was made official
by the 1988 Constitution.
2. The post-1990 macroeconomic strategy did
not present obstacles to continuity in implementing
the redemocratization agenda in the social field.
I intend to question those two arguments and
highlight that, since the early 1990s, the Brazilian
social policy has been subjected to tension between
two opposing paradigms: the Minimum State
versus the embryonic Welfare State. I will emphasize
that the “Citizen Constitution” has been through
an ordeal and survives while mutilated and
transfigured.
“Notable continuity”?
The first argument defended by Costa is that
from the 1990s there has been “a notable continui-
ty in the scope of social protection created by the
new Brazilian democracy” (my emphasis). From
that perspective, the Fernando Henrique Cardoso
– FHC – administration (1995/2002) “was undou-
btedly successful” in advancing the transformati-
on agenda formulated by the forces which fought
for redemocratization. Still according to the au-
thor, “as in the macroeconomic management, the
FHC and Lula administrations maintained the ins-
titutional guidance of the social protection regime
practically the same during nearly two decades” (my
emphasis).
The main point which supports this thesis leans
on the perception that one of the major “innovati-
ons” of the FHC Administration was to “combine
universal and targeted policies without opposing to
the federalist agenda of traditional social areas such
as education, health and social assistance”.
I disagree with this interpretation for two rea-
sons:
Firstly, it is inappropriate to consider the “tar-
geting” as a continuation of the redemocratization
agenda – “a critical response to the lack of focus
and inefficiency of Brazilian social public policies
during the military regime”. The redemocratizati-
on agenda was based on the Welfare State para-
digm and the “targeting” is the antithesis of this
paradigm. Instead of continuity, targeting was a
space opened by market forces in order to insert
the Welfare State into the agenda. Furthermore,
for the redemocratization agenda1, fighting pover-
ty did not meat to “target”. The strategy was based
on adopting measures of a structural nature (the
more equal distribution of income and of wealth,
etc.) while simultaneously adopting “emergency
measures, aiming at long term results”, which
would offer “immediate relief from living conditi-
ons of poorer Brazilians”.
Secondly, when speaking of the “notable conti-
nuity”, the author restricts to only three sectors of
2 Departamento de Política e História Econômica,
















the redemocratization agenda: basic education,
healthcare and social assistance:
. In some cases there has been a clear strategy
encouraged by the Federal Executive which aimed
at suppressing rights gained in 1988. This is especi-
ally the case with the Social Security (Constitutio-
nal Amendment number 20/98)2 and the employ-
ment and union reforms3.
. In other cases, the redemocratization agenda
has been disfigured or outcast. This is especially
the case with popular housing, sanitation, public
transportation and rural reform policies.
. Even in the case of education, health and soci-
al assistance sectors, institutional progress obtai-
ned from 1993 happened under strong attacks by
economic authorities, who systematically under-
mined such efforts.
. Finally, how can one speak of “notable conti-
nuity” if the macroeconomic strategy adopted from
1990 disorganized the labor market and produced
dramatic impact on employment and income? .
Macroeconomic strategy
versus social development strategy
The second central argument defended by Cos-
ta is that the post-1990 macroeconomic strategy
did not present obstacles to continuity in imple-
menting the redemocratization agenda in the social
field. In order to provide the basis to support this
point of view, the author leans on the document “A
Strategy for Social Development”4. In his own wor-
ds, this document seemed to have defined an agenda
consistent with the new development model. […] It
seems evident that economic stability with external
integration would lead to the reorganization of the
social protection system within the new conditions
imposed to the availability of financing from the pu-
blic sector (my emphasis).
Firstly, this rhetoric summarizes the vision of
parts of the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy
Party), who had little power in the correlation be-
tween internal forces and the government. FHC’s
real strategy reflected the position of the more con-
servative groups. In the economic area, the disa-
greements between the “orthodox” and “develop-
mentists” were made amply evident5 ever since the
first term of office. In the second term, the ortho-
dox view defended by former Minister Pedro Ma-
lan prevailed even more. According to former Mi-
nister Luiz Carlos Mendonça de Barros, “FHC
always supported Pedro Malan”. Thus, the afore-
mentioned document had no importance what-
soever in terms of the future of social and econo-
mic policy. It was forgotten in the first term of
office and buried in the second.
However, secondly, the most important thing is
to demonstrate that the facts were opposite to the
rhetoric. The core argument which I defend is that
from 1990-2006 there was an extreme incompatibi-
lity between the macroeconomic and state reform
strategies, central and hegemonic in the governmen-
tal agenda, and the actual possibilities of develop-
ment and social inclusion. Under the political and
ideological hegemony of the “single thought”, Bra-
zil became, from 1990, a fertile ground for neolibe-
ral experiments in the macroeconomic field. The
Real Plan contributed to the process of inserting
Brazil in the international scenario which was do-
minated by financial globalization6. This context
defined the strong opposition between the neolibe-
ral agenda and the redemocratization agenda, in
the social and economic field.
Firstly, due to the economy’s stagnation. It is
necessary to emphasize a crucial point, now: the
stagnation was an implicit variable in the stabiliza-
tion model adopted by the Real Plan. The mainte-
nance of the “fixed exchange rate” depended on high
interest rates – in some moments higher than 40%
(Mexico, Asia and Russia crises) – which inhibited
growth (between 1990 and 2002 the average annual
growth rate of the GDP was little over 2.5%). The
stagnation, in addition to the set of other liberali-
zing changes, disorganized the labor market and
weakened the union and employment relati-
onships7.
Secondly, the Real Plan allied stable prices to
open trade and the Real’s over-appreciation which
worsened the Balance of Payments crisis. The way
out was to build up reserves by keeping interest
rates high. Consequently, total public debt as a per-
centage of the GDP rose from 30% to 56% between
1994 and 2002. This debt profile expanded the ex-
penditures on interests (7.2% of the GDP in 2002).
The greater pressure of financial expenses limited
the range of financing for social spending. A study
conducted by Castro, Ribeiro and Carvalho8  reve-
als that between 1995 and 2002 the federal social
spending’s share of the total government expendi-
tures fell by 9% (from 59% to 50%), while the fi-
nancial expenses’ share rose by 13% (from 20% to
33%). Between 1995 and 2002, federal social spen-
ding as a percentage of the GDP rose by 1.5% (from
11.2% to 12.7%), while financial expenses rose by
4.8% (from 3.7% to 8.5%). Federal spending on
Education fell between 1995 and 2002 (from 0.95%
to 0.76% of the GDP); the same happened with














To sum up, I have attempted to argue that there
are no concrete elements which support the conti-
nuity hypothesis. More specifically, in the path fo-
llowed by the Brazilian social policy in the last five
decades it is possible to identify two opposite mo-
vements9. The first points to the path of restructu-
ring institutional, financial and protection bases
which are particular to the Welfare State. This pro-
cess was boosted from the mid-70s, in the midst of
the social fight for Brazil’s redemocratization. It was
conducted by the large social and popular move-
ment which opposed the Military Regime. This long
journey culminated in the 1988 Constitution.
The second points to the opposite direction:
trying to halt the establishment of those bases draf-
ted in 1988. After the first opposing marches (in
the last years of the democratic transition), this
movement was strengthened from 1990. Since then,
a new cycle of liberal and conservative reforms be-
gan. In the social field, the principles of the neolibe-
ral paradigm are absolutely opposite to those of
the 1988 Constitution. The “Citizen Constitution”
transformed into the “Anachronistic Constituti-
on”10,11. The tensions between paradigms so oppo-
site are evident: the social security versus social in-
surance; universalization versus targeting; govern-
ment-sponsored offer of services versus privatiza-
tion; employment rights versus deregulation and
flexibilization. To sum up, this is the context of
tensions to which the social policies are being sub-
mitted since 1988 until today.
Due to the limited space for these comments, I
would like to mention a paper12 which summarizes
the several attempts to disfigure the social victories
from 1988 until 2008, distributed in the following
periods:
. Opposition at the National Constitutional
Convention (1987/88)
. The First Transgressions (1989)
. The First Stage of the Attempt to Counter-
Reform (1990/92)
. The Funeral Postponed (1993)
. The Second Stage of the Attempt to Counter-
Reform (1993/02)
. New Attempts to Counter-Reform (2003/06)
I hope I have made it clear that the resistance and
mutilation attempts of the redemocratization agenda
– most of which carried out by the Federal Executive,
since 1988 until today – do not offer any elements
which make the “notable continuity” thesis credible.
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As a co-editor in this supplement, together with
Nilson do Rosário Costa, I could not refrain from
making a few comments on his deep and provok-
